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Reshaping the World Order
How Washington Should
Reform International Institutions

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth
Creating a league of democracies, revamping the un Security
Council, revitalizing the nuclear nonproliferation regime—proposals
for revising international institutions are all the rage these days.
And for good reason: no one sitting down to design the perfect
global framework for the twenty-ﬁrst century would come up with
anything like the current one. The existing architecture is a relic of
the preoccupations and power relationships of the middle of the last
century—out of sync with today’s world of rising powers and new
challenges, from terrorism and nuclear proliferation to ﬁnancial
instability and global warming.
It is one thing to agree that change is needed, but quite another to
settle on its speciﬁcs. As soon as the conversation shifts to brass tacks,
competing visions begin to clash. In an anarchic world of self-interested
states—that is to say, in the real world—the chances that those states
will cooperate are best when a hegemon takes the lead. There are, of
course, good reasons to question whether the United States, the only
contender for such a role today, is up to the task. Under the George W.
Bush administration, consideration of global institutional change fell
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through the cracks. The administration did not invest much in international institutions and tended to denigrate them for hindering,
rather than enabling, the realization of U.S. interests. But with the
election of President Barack Obama, the United States’ reluctance to
push for institutional change now appears to have ended. In a 2007
address to the Chicago Council on Global Aªairs, Obama stressed
that “it was America that largely built a system of international
institutions that carried us through the Cold War. . . . Instead of
constraining our power, these institutions magniﬁed it.” “Today it’s
become fashionable to disparage the United Nations, the World
Bank, and other international organizations,” he continued. “In fact,
reform of these bodies is urgently needed if they are to keep pace with
the fast-moving threats we face.”
Some would argue that the United States’ window of opportunity for
fostering institutional change has closed. In today’s “post-American
world,” the thinking goes, surely only an idealist would suggest
that Washington retains the power to lead the way out of the current institutional impasse. And even if the United States were
somehow able to come up with enough hard power to spearhead reform,
skeptics question whether a hegemon that has squandered so much
goodwill in eight years of unilateralism and rule breaking would
have many followers.
Nonetheless, there are hardheaded reasons to believe that the
United States has the means and the motive to spearhead the
foundation of a new institutional order. It still has the power and
legitimacy such an eªort would require, as well as a strong incentive
to mount it, because overall, international institutions channel the
United States’ power and enhance its security. If Washington
wants to succeed, it should follow a strategy that highlights the
beneﬁts of the institutional revisions, links the proposed order to
the current one, and uses the United States’ power position to persuade
other governments to sign on to reform. This approach to pursuing
institutional change presents a challenge for diplomacy, but one
that many of history’s hegemons have met in order to smooth the
path to reform. And it is a challenge worth taking up if the United
States wants to maximize the prospects for a peaceful, prosperous
twenty-ﬁrst century.
[50]
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where there’s a will
Even a ruthlessly self-interested United States should want a
robust framework of international institutions, which include not just
formal organizations and treaties but also informal rules and standards of legitimacy. Why? Because institutions facilitate the United
States’ own global leadership. Clearly, it is far easier to manage the
world economy with an eªective World Trade Organization (wto).
Less obvious but just as signiﬁcant are the manifold ways that international institutions help the United States advance its security interests.
Marshaling “coalitions of the willing” is an ine⁄cient approach. Each
new coalition requires striking a new set of bargains with diªerent
partners and oªering them new carrots and sticks. Within an established
institution, in contrast, states develop habits for working together.
Having an institution in place to facilitate cooperation on one issue
also makes it easier for the participating states to rapidly achieve
cooperation on a related issue. Nato’s intelligence-sharing network
was designed in the Cold War to gather information on the Soviet
Union, for example, but later was quickly adapted to deal with the
unforeseen issue of global Islamist terrorism.
Institutions are no panacea. They do not obviate the need for
tough negotiating between states. But they do tend to center the bargaining on how the burden of cooperation should be shared rather
than on whether cooperation should occur at all—a focus that is
preferable for the United States. The United States may be frustrated
that other members of nato are not contributing more to the mission
in Afghanistan, but it is far better to have this particular conversation
than to debate whether countries such as France and Germany should
make any contribution at all.
As interdependence among countries intensiﬁes and the list of global
problems that the United States cannot resolve on its own grows, the
beneﬁts of international institutions will increase. Many current problems
require continuous attention rather than one-shot solutions. To prevent
terrorism, for example, the world will need to establish a reliable and
e⁄cient set of controls for monitoring borders. Such an eªort will work
only if appropriate standards are widely adopted and cooperation in
implementing them becomes routine. Even if it turns out that the
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United States is less vulnerable than other states to new global problems—
such as the augmented threat of infectious diseases and greater ﬂows of
refugees from conﬂicts in Africa—it is clearly better oª in a world with
institutional structures that establish standards to address them.
The world’s growing complexity means that governments place
a premium on accumulating information in order to meet today’s
challenges. Although the United States is able to gather a great deal
of information on its own, it sometimes wastes resources by unknowingly duplicating the eªorts of its allies. And when it possesses only
partial information, its work must be combined with that of other
countries. Routinizing the sharing of data within global institutions
can help with both problems. Moreover, information about topics
such as nuclear programs, which are sensitive, may only be available
via international organizations, whose perceived impartiality and wider
inspection access often put them in a better position to secure it.
Institutions can also reduce the need for states to actively manage
the international system, thereby lessening the sometimes irksome
perception that U.S. power is being exercised. The U.S. government
has a strong interest in gaining as much
information as possible about Iran’s nuclear
It will be harder for
program, for example. Conveniently for
the United States to
Washington, the International Atomic
Energy Agency is directing the eªort; absent
advance its interests if
the iaea, the United States would be
it does not invest in
forced to burn up resources and political
international institutions. capital to procure such information and
would likely be much less successful. In
short, the more the network of global institutions protects the interests
of the United States, the less Washington needs to employ its power
in ways that provoke resentment among other governments.
The Bush administration largely failed to recognize the beneﬁts of
international security institutions. It consistently emphasized that
working through them could be ine⁄cient for the United States
(claiming that they impose coordination costs and make it harder to
conduct military operations) and might allow other states to tie down
the American Gulliver in a web of constraints. Although it would be
a mistake to ignore these downsides, of course, it is an even greater
[52]
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one to fail to recognize that leading powers beneﬁt from setting up
and working within international institutions.
Realist statesmen such as George Kennan and realist scholars such
as Robert Gilpin have shown that institutions generally enable leading
states more than they constrain them. Although admittedly lonely
voices in the realist camp, they have argued that institutions are eªective
tools of the powerful. From this perspective, the extensive discussion of
institutions as constraints during the Bush administration undoubtedly
stuck most observers outside the United States as being overwrought.
Given the United States’ power and potential for going it alone, its
partners within institutions recognize that Washington generally stands
to lose the least when cooperation fails—and this awareness often pushes
them toward the United States’ position. When the constraints become
excessive in a particular institution, the United States is su⁄ciently powerful that it can pull back from cooperating without prejudicing its
general ability to sustain cooperation within other institutions in other
areas. Even when the dispute in the un over Iraq reached its greatest
intensity in 2003, French and German diplomats did not alter their
approach to negotiations with the United States over the wto. States
are well aware that the United States has a strong interest in furthering
the wto and that this interest exists independently from its interests in,
and approach to, the un. It is also well understood that, more than any
other state, the United States has a greater ability to retaliate when
others withdraw cooperation in an attempt to punish the United States
for its behavior in a given institution.
Realists tend to appreciate the use of power but are skeptical of the
importance of institutions. (Liberals, for their part, appreciate the importance of institutions but are frequently skeptical of using power to reshape
them.) But the beneﬁts of international institutions are grounded in
realism: it will be harder for the United States to advance its national
interests if it does not invest in them.
the 1 + x world
It was only by ignoring the beneﬁts of institutions and overestimating
their costs that neoconservatives in the Bush administration were able
to dismiss the role that they can play in fostering U.S. global leadership.
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Unencumbered by these doubts about the usefulness of institutions,
the United States is likely now to push for reform. And that is no
small matter. Institutional change is much more likely when there is a
dominant state with the legitimacy to lead and the capabilities necessary
to help overcome problems of collective action. The question is, Does
the United States have the power and the legitimacy today to succeed?
Only a few years ago, pundits were absorbed in debates about
American “empire.” Now, the conventional wisdom is that the world
is rapidly approaching the end of the unipolar system with the United
States as the sole superpower. A dispassionate look at the facts shows
that this view understates U.S. power as much as recent talk of empire
exaggerated it. That the United States weighs more on the traditional
scales of world power than has any other state in modern history is as
true now as it was when the commentator Charles Krauthammer
proclaimed the advent of a “unipolar moment” in these pages nearly
two decades ago. The United States continues to account for about half
the world’s defense spending and one-quarter of its economic output.
Some of the reasons for bearishness concern public policy problems that
can be ﬁxed (expensive health care in the United States, for example),
whereas many of the reasons for bullishness are more fundamental (such
as the greater demographic challenges faced by the United States’
potential rivals).
So why has opinion shifted so quickly from visions of empire to
gloomy declinism? One reason is that the United States’ successes at
the turn of the century led to irrational exuberance, thereby setting unreasonably high standards for measuring the superpower’s performance.
From 1999 to 2003, seemingly easy U.S. victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq led some to conclude that the United States could do what no
great power in history had managed before: eªortlessly defeat its adversaries. It was only a matter of time before such pie-in-the-sky benchmarks
proved unattainable. Subsequent di⁄culties in Afghanistan and Iraq
dashed illusions of omnipotence, but these upsets hardly displaced the
United States as the world’s leading state, and there is no reason to believe
that the militaries of its putative rivals would have performed any better.
The United States did not cease to be a superpower when its policies in
Cuba and Vietnam failed in the 1960s; bipolarity lived on for three
decades. Likewise, the United States remains the sole superpower today.
[54]
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Another key reason for the multipolar mania is “the rise of the
rest.” Impressed by the rapid economic growth of China and India,
many write as if multipolarity has already returned. But such pronouncements mistake current trajectories for ﬁnal outcomes—a common
strategic error with deep psychological roots. The greatest concern
in the Cold War, for example, came not
from the Soviet Union’s actually attaining A state that is rising
parity with the United States but from the
expectation that it would do so in the future. should not be confused
Veterans of that era recall how the launch with one that has risen,
of Sputnik in 1957 fed the perception that
Soviet power was growing rapidly, leading just as a state that is
some policymakers and analysts to start act- declining should not be
ing as if the Soviet Union were already as
written o⁄ as having
powerful as the United States. A state that
is rising should not be confused with one already declined.
that has risen, just as a state that is declining
should not be written oª as having already declined. China is generally
seen as the country best positioned to emerge as a superpower challenger to the United States. Yet depending on how one measures gdp,
China’s economy is between 20 percent and 43 percent the size of the
United States’. More dramatic is the diªerence in gdp per capita, for
which all measures show China’s as being less than 10 percent of the
United States’. Absent a 1930s-style depression that spares potential
U.S. rivals, the United States will not be replaced as the sole superpower
for a very long time. Real multipolarity—an international system of
three or more evenly matched powers—is nowhere on the horizon.
Relative power between states shifts slowly.
This tendency to conﬂate trends with outcomes is often driven by
the examination in isolation of certain components of state power.
If the habit during the Cold War was to focus on military power, the
recent trend has been to single out economic output. No declinist
tract is complete without a passage noting that although the United
States may remain a military superpower, economic multipolarity is,
or soon will be, the order of the day. Much as highlighting the Soviet
Union’s military power meant overlooking the country’s economic and
technological feet of clay, examining only economic output means
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putting on blinders. In 1991, Japan’s economy was two-thirds the size
of the United States’, which, according to the current popular metric,
would mean that with the Soviet Union’s demise, the world shifted
from bipolarity to, well, bipolarity. Such a partial assessment of power
will produce no more accurate an analysis today.
Nor will giving in to apprehension about the growing importance
of nonstate actors. The National Intelligence Council’s report Global
Trends 2025 grabbed headlines by forecasting the coming multipolarity,
anticipating a power shift as much to nonstate actors as to fast-growing
countries. But nonstate actors are nothing new—compare the scale
and scope of today’s pirates oª the Somali coast with those of their
eighteenth-century predecessors or the political power of today’s
multinational corporations with that of such behemoths as the British
East India Company—and projections of their rise may well be as
much hype as reﬂections of reality. And even if the power of nonstate
actors is rising, this should only increase the incentives for interstate cooperation; nonstate threats do not aªect just the United
States. Most nonstate actors’ behavior, moreover, still revolves around
inﬂuencing the decisions of states. Nongovernmental organizations
typically focus on trying to get states to change their policies, and the
same is true of most terrorists.
When it comes to making, managing, and remaking international
institutions, states remain the most important actors—and the
United States is the most important of them. No other country will
match the United States’ combination of wealth, size, technological
capacity, and productivity in the foreseeable future. The world is and
will long remain a 1 + x world, with one superpower and x number of
major powers. A shift from 1 + 3 to 1 + 4 or 5 or 6 would have many
important consequences, but it would not change the fact that the
United States will long be in a far stronger position to lead the world
than any other state.
the legitimacy to lead?
For analysts such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, the
key reason for skepticism about the United States’ ability to spearhead
global institutional change is not a lack of power but a lack of legitimacy.
[56]
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Other states may simply refuse to follow a leader whose legitimacy
has been squandered under the Bush administration; in this view, the
legitimacy to lead is a ﬁxed resource that can be obtained only under
special circumstances. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues
in After Victory that states have been well positioned to reshape the
institutional order only after emerging victorious from some titanic
struggle, such as the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, or
World War I or II. For the neoconservative Robert Kagan, the legitimacy to lead came naturally to the United States during the Cold
War, when it was providing the signal service of balancing the Soviet
Union. The implication is that today, in the absence of such salient
sources of legitimacy, the wellsprings of support for U.S. leadership
have dried up for good.
But this view is mistaken. For one thing, it overstates how accepted
U.S. leadership was during the Cold War: anyone who recalls the
Euromissile crisis of the 1980s, for example, will recognize that mass
opposition to U.S. policy (in that case, over stationing intermediaterange nuclear missiles in Europe) is not a recent phenomenon. For
another, it understates how dynamic and malleable legitimacy is.
Legitimacy is based on the belief that an action, an actor, or a political
order is proper, acceptable, or natural. An action—such as the Vietnam
War or the invasion of Iraq—may come to be seen as illegitimate
without sparking an irreversible crisis of legitimacy for the actor or
the order. When the actor concerned has disproportionately more
material resources than other states, the sources of its legitimacy can
be refreshed repeatedly. After all, this is hardly the ﬁrst time Americans
have worried about a crisis of legitimacy. Tides of skepticism concerning
U.S. leadership arguably rose as high or higher after the fall of Saigon
in 1975 and during Ronald Reagan’s ﬁrst term, when he called the
Soviet Union an “evil empire.” Even George W. Bush, a globally
unpopular U.S. president with deeply controversial policies, oversaw
a marked improvement in relations with France, Germany, and India in
recent years—even before the elections of Chancellor Angela Merkel
in Germany and President Nicolas Sarkozy in France.
Of course, the ability of the United States to weather such crises
of legitimacy in the past hardly guarantees that it can lead the system
in the future. But there are reasons for optimism. Some of the apparent

fore ign affairs . March /April 2009

[57]

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth
damage to U.S. legitimacy might merely be the result of the Bush
administration’s approach to diplomacy and international institutions.
Key underlying conditions remain particularly favorable for sustaining
and even enhancing U.S. legitimacy in the years ahead. The United
States continues to have a far larger share of
An action may come to the human and material resources for shaping
global perceptions than any other state, as
be seen as illegitimate
well as the unrivaled wherewithal to produce
public goods that reinforce the beneﬁts of its
without sparking
global role. No other state has any claim to
an irreversible crisis
leadership commensurate with Washington’s.
And largely because of the power position
of legitimacy.
the United States still occupies, there is no
prospect of a counterbalancing coalition emerging anytime soon to
challenge it. In the end, the legitimacy of a system’s leader hinges on
whether the system’s members see the leader as acceptable or at least
preferable to realistic alternatives. Legitimacy is not necessarily about
normative approval: one may dislike the United States but think its
leadership is natural under the circumstances or the best that can
be expected.
Moreover, history provides abundant evidence that past leading
states—such as Spain, France, and the United Kingdom—were able
to revise the international institutions of their day without the special
circumstances Ikenberry and Kagan cite. Spain fashioned both
normative and positive laws to legitimize its conquest of indigenous
Americans in the early seventeenth century; France instituted modern
concepts of state borders to meet its needs as Europe’s preeminent
land power in the eighteenth century; and the United Kingdom fostered
rules on piracy, neutral shipping, and colonialism to suit its interests
as a developing maritime empire in the nineteenth century. As Wilhelm
Grewe documents in his magisterial The Epochs of International Law,
these states accomplished such feats partly through the unsubtle use of
power: bribes, coercion, and the allure of lucrative long-term cooperation.
Less obvious but often more important, the bargaining hands of the
leading states were often strengthened by the general perception that
they could pursue their interests in even less palatable ways—notably,
through the naked use of force. Invariably, too, leading states have had
[58]
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the power to set the international agenda, indirectly aªecting the
development of new rules by deﬁning the problems they were developed
to address. Given its naval primacy and global trading interests, the
United Kingdom was able to propel the slave trade to the forefront
of the world’s agenda for several decades after it had itself abolished slavery at home, in 1833. The bottom line is that the United
States today has the necessary legitimacy to shepherd reform of the
international system.
a strategy for reform
Unfortunately, to acknowledge that revising the institutional
order has happened frequently in the past and that the United States
retains the power and legitimacy to lead this eªort reveals nothing
about how to do it. What is the best way for Washington to go about
the job? From centuries of state practice and academic theorizing, ﬁve
general precepts have emerged that are especially relevant to the United
States today: play up the reciprocal beneﬁts of the proposed reform,
make sure the revised framework provides public goods, link the
proposed order to the current order, strategically exploit inconsistent
objections to the proposals, and persuade others that change is needed.
First, institutional reforms are more likely to be endorsed if their
beneﬁts for all participants are highlighted. Given that reciprocity is
one of the basic principles underlying the current institutional order,
the more states are convinced that they stand to beneﬁt under a new
or revised institution, the less they will be inclined to object to it. The
Proliferation Security Initiative—a U.S.-sponsored multilateral
framework for interdicting weapons of mass destruction at sea, in
the air, and on land—is the most prominent recent example of this
dynamic. Although the psi was designed to give the U.S. Navy more
operational latitude, the Bush administration regularly referred to it
as a “global eªort.” The initiative explicitly created new de jure rights
for other parties, even though de facto only the United States gained
any new rights. For example, the psi-related bilateral treaty between
the United States and Liberia accords each country the right to board,
search, and detain the cargo of any vessel on the high seas that is ﬂying
the other country’s ﬂag and is suspected of tra⁄cking in weapons of
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mass destruction—even though Liberia (which has the second-largest
shipping registry in the world) has no navy. A related move is to create
reciprocal rights for others to exercise in the future. A classic example
is President Harry Truman’s 1945 unilateral declaration extending the
United States’ jurisdiction over the resources of the continental shelf
adjacent to its territorial waters. This assertion of a completely novel
right was an unquestionable violation of international law, but other
coastal states followed suit so swiftly that the new right assumed the
status of customary law within a few years.
Any institutional change should also be sure to provide public
goods, such as stiﬂing terrorism or stabilizing the global economy, in
order to remind other states of the beneﬁts of U.S. leadership. What
constitutes a public good is not always straightforward, so the United
States needs to persuade others that what it is supplying is important.
If the United States proposes an institutional shift that does not seem
to provide a public good in one area, it can potentially overcome any
resistance by providing public goods in other areas. In short, the less
self-interested the United States seems in general, the more likely
other states will be to support its proposed institutional revisions.
Linking proposed changes to widely accepted parts of the current
order is another proven strategy for institutional reform. The probability that an institutional change will succeed depends in part on its
consistency with the wider order, and so the United States should use
its diplomatic and intellectual resources to persuade others of the
reform’s strong links to well-established precedents. U.S. actions under
Bush did reﬂect some sensitivity to this precept. For example, then
Undersecretary of State John Bolton, the U.S. o⁄cial who spearheaded
the psi, made a point of stressing that it built on “existing nonproliferation treaties and regimes” and was “consistent with national and
international legal authorities and international law.”
Advocates of serious institutional change would be wise to make sure
their proposals are consistent with their past positions and to strategically
exploit the inconsistencies of their opponents’ arguments. When proposing reform, the United States needs to think about possible objections
from other states and then seek to minimize their legal force. The
more the goals of the proposal seem to contradict the United States’
other positions in other contexts, the more hypocritical and self-serving
[60]
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the United States will appear. At the same time, the United States
should frame the institutional change in ways that make objections from
the most important states seem inconsistent with their past positions.
The Bush administration executed this strategy with some success
when it devised new rules to combat terrorism. Un Security Council
Resolution 1373, for example, transformed a raft of U.S.-sponsored
antiterrorism measures into formal and legally
binding international commitments. To many “We found out about
observers, this represented an eªort to revise
accepted customary international law in a the Bush doctrine by
manner that advantaged the United States, downloading it from
which can send its military nearly anywhere,
and potentially disadvantaged weaker states, the White House
which lack such a capacity and could ﬁnd Web site,” one French
themselves accused of harboring terrorists.
diplomat noted.
But Washington was able to portray these
objections as inconsistent with many governments’ previous pronouncements about the overarching need to
combat terrorism, and these governments ultimately did not block
Resolution 1373; the end result was an enhanced ability to respond to
terrorist threats.
Finally, when seeking to revise existing institutions or create new
ones, reformers must persuade other states that the changes are both
necessary and wise. In its calls for reform, the United States should
not limit itself to purely legal arguments. It should also convince other
key states that changing global circumstances require the ﬁxes it
proposes. In this regard, the Bush administration performed remarkably
poorly. A hallmark of U.S. foreign policy under Bush was a systematic
devaluation of persuasion, argument, and diplomacy. When crafting
its new preventive-war doctrine, for example, the Bush administration
failed to consult other governments. One French defense o⁄cial recalled
that in the old days, high-level U.S. o⁄cials would travel to Paris
for extensive consultations over any new nato policy, even when the
change had already been approved in Washington and further substantive alterations were impossible. “We found out about the Bush
doctrine by downloading it from the White House Web site,” he
noted. “The doctrine has much to recommend it, but that is not the
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way to communicate with allies.” To eªectively promote institutional
change, the United States does not have to persuade every state, but
it does need to win over those inﬂuential actors whose decisions will
sway many others.
regime change
The world is awash in new challenges that the current international
order is ill equipped to handle. Most observers have long recognized
that international institutions need to be adapted to these new challenges.
(If any doubts remained about this, they should have been quieted by
the recent global ﬁnancial crisis.) And it is this acknowledged need for
revised or new institutions that opens up a great deal of space for the
United States to remake international institutions.
Institutional change is never easy, and the United States is not
omnipotent. But it is up to the task. Even the Bush administration,
obviously disinclined to invest in the revision or creation of international institutions, was strikingly successful when it tried. This was
true even when it came to institutional initiatives that were clearly
shaped by U.S. negotiators to best align with U.S. interests, such
as the psi.
Institutions redesigned to meet today’s challenges are clearly in the
United States’ long-term interest. Imagine, for example, a world in which
a revised Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty no longer granted all states
an “inalienable right” to build nuclear enrichment and reprocessing
facilities (which can be quickly converted for military use) but rather
forbade such facilities in countries other than those where they already
exist, while guaranteeing to all states access to low-level ﬁssile material
at a fair price. This would draw a clear line, sorely lacking today,
between peaceful and warlike nuclear programs. It is an easy step
from this hypothetical world to one in which there is a strong norm
against any new nuclear fuel reprocessing. Any state that attempted
to do this would be considered a pariah—lacking the respect and
rights due to legitimate members of the international community.
In such a world, states would be much less likely to pursue nuclear
weapons, and if any did, the path to taking tough antiproliferation
measures would be clear.
[62]
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The ability to take such measures would also be enhanced if an
alternative forum for coordinating economic sanctions were created.
Reaching agreement in the un on decisive sanctions against proliferating states remains di⁄cult because of the un’s broad membership.
It might be beneﬁcial to have a mini multilateral institution (think of
nato in Kosovo or Afghanistan) that coordinates economic sanctions
among key U.S. allies, not just nato members but also countries such
as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The Nuclear Suppliers Group
and the Wassenaar Arrangement have great value, but these existing
multilateral regimes focus only on export controls. A mini multilateral
institution could be used to rapidly implement broad-based economic
sanctions against nuclear proliferators. Having such a sanctions institution in place might well create just the sort of competitive pressure
that would spur un action. Failing that, coordinated sanctions by the
members of nato plus Japan, South Korea, and Australia, which
together account for two-thirds of global gdp, could place enormous
economic pressure on a potential nuclear proliferator.
Updating the current architecture of international institutions,
which are so out of sync with the modern world, is imperative if new
global challenges are to be met and the national interests of the
United States are to be best advanced. No other state is in such a
favorable position to promote institutional shifts, and the United States
will not always have this opportunity. The time to seize it is now.∂
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